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The Korean Constitutional Court (KCC) recently ruled in 27-1(A) KCCR 20, 2009Hun-
Ba17· 205 (Consolidated), February 26, 2015 (hereinafter the “2015Decision”), that Article 
241 of the Criminal Act related to adultery is unconstitutional due to its abuse of sexual 
autonomy and the freedom and privacy of personal life. It was a change of stance from the 
previous constitutional interpretations upheld in over four judicial rulings. 
In Korea, the legislature and executive are often criticized for their lack of contribution to 
decriminalization.  They are in fact responsible for an increase in the criminal law. Therefore, 
the significance of this recent additional ‘decriminalizing’ decision by the Constitutional Court 
must be highlighted, providing a crucial step towards decriminalization.
This 2015Decision on unconstitutionality reflects the trend of the rest of the world where 
many countries are banning the criminal regulation of adultery and the fact that some doubts 
are cast on whether the regulation is helpful for maintaining household integrity and marriage 
purity. The decision also reflects the criticism that the criminal law intervenes in the privacy of 
the individual and represents an abuse of the state’s punishment power. It also reflects a 
weakening of the justification in the recent era for protecting women as a socially vulnerable 
class. There are still various opinions regarding the appropriateness of abolishing the criminal 
regulation of adultery, but the most important fact is that it has been abolished in Korea by this 
landmark decision of the KCC.
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I. Introduction
1. Prologue
The Korean Constitutional Court (KCC) has recently made the decision 
(Decision of Feb. 26, 2015, 2009Hun-Ba17· 205 (Consolidated) (hereinafter 
the “2015Decision”)1)) that Article 241 of the Criminal Act related to 
adultery goes against the constitution due to its abuse of sexual autonomy 
and the freedom and privacy of personal life. It was a change of stance from 
the previous constitutional decisions ruled over four times.
Adultery is defined generally in legal academia and praxis as the “[v]
oluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and someone other 
than the person’s spouse.”2) In the meantime, the criminal regulation of 
adultery3) has been deemed constitutional by the Constitutional Court four 
times, where six Justices provided constitutional opinions for the 
1990Decision4) and the 1993Decision5) and eight Justices gave constitutional 
opinions for the 2001Decision.6) However, in the most recent decision, 
known as the 2008Decision,7) four Justices ruled it as constitutional, four 
Justices ruled it as unconstitutional, and one Justice provided constitutional 
discordance adjudication that aroused interest from the public about the 
decision from the Constitutional Court.
1) This “2015Decision” has not yet (as of March 2016) been translated officially by the 
KCC. It is expected that the official translation will be published in printed form by January 
2017 at the latest. And in this article, I will use “YYYYDecision”(i.e. without gap) as 
abbreviation of the specific frequently mentioned decisions.
2) See BlacK’s laW dictionary 62 (10th ed., 2014).
3) For a historical perspective about adultery, see, e.g., Gung-Sik Jung, Hankuk-eui-
kantongchoe-eui Beopjesajeok Kochal [Historical Review on the Crime of Adultery in Korea], in dong-
Woon shin, naKtaeJoe Mit KantongJoe e KWanhan yeonKU [a stUdy on the adUltery and the 
aBortion froM the VieWpoint of criMinal laW reforM in Korea] (1991); Kuk Cho, The Crime of 
Adultery in Korea: Inadequate Means for Maintaining Morality and Protecting Women, J. Korean l. 
2, 2002, at 84-86.
4) Constitutional Court of Korea, 89Hun-Ma82, Sep. 10, 1990.
5) Constitutional Court of Korea, 90Hun-Ga70, Mar. 11, 1993.
6) Constitutional Court of Korea, 2000Hun-Ba60, Oct. 25, 2001.
7) Constitutional Court of Korea, 2007Hun-Ga17, Oct. 30, 2008.
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In fact, after the unconstitutional ruling in 2015, the illegality of adultery 
outside of the criminal law continues to be approved. It was demonstrated 
in the case involving an ex-trainee of the Judicial Research and Training 
Institute (JRTI),8) who was expelled for adultery and filed a suit against the 
president of the institute due to the invalidity of the expulsion. He lost at 
both the original and appellate trials, and furthermore, the civil liability of 
the trainee was acknowledged.
2. Background 
Since the 1960s, there has been an international tide of decriminalization 
(in order to prevent the abuse of over-criminalization). Decriminalization is 
the repeal or amendment (undoing) of statutes which made certain acts 
criminal, so that those acts no longer are crimes or subject to prosecution, 
though perhaps regulatory fines or permits might still apply. After the 
Second World War ideologies of liberalization of criminal law or demorali-
zation were disseminated.9) The idea of “decriminalization,” that ‘actions 
that are unethical yet do not violate the benefit and protection of the law 
should not be criminalized’, has been widespread internationally. South 
Korea is also engaged in discussions on decriminalization. 
According to criminal policy studies, “criminalization” refers to the 
conditions in which new types of violations of the benefit and protection of 
the law occur due to changes in the social structure. In order to deal with 
the rise of potential situations, new legislation is passed to regulate criminal 
justice, and this is the first step in “criminalization.” On the other hand, due 
to changes in legal strategy to reduce the range of the states’ administrative 
justice, there are cases in which what was considered a crime is now 
permitted. This is called “decriminalization.” It mainly emerged due to 
8) Under the then judiciary exam (as of around 2010), the number of new lawyers 
admitted each year was limited to 1,000. Then, successful candidates had to complete the 
mandatory two years of training courses at the Judicial Research & Training Institute (JRTI) in 
order to join the bar in Korea. The JRTI is managed by the Supreme Court.
9) And nation-states around the world revised their criminal laws on sexual activities. For 
more information about this, for example, see D. J. Frank, B. J. Camp & S. A. Boutcher, 
Worldwide trends in the criminal regulation of sex, 1945 to 2005, aMerican sociological reVieW, 
vol. 75 no. 6, 867-893 (2010).
328 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 15: 325
criticism against the hypertrophy of criminal law, stigma theory, and the 
failure of the national public execution system. 
In terms of constitutional theory, this is directly related to the topic of 
‘equal individual freedom’10) or ‘the right to pursue one’s happiness.’11) 
Because decriminalization reflects changing social and moral views about 
whether an individual act, which has been claimed as one’s freedom or 
pursuit of happiness, is still to be punished or not. A society may come to 
the view that an act is not harmful, should no longer be criminalized, or is 
otherwise not a matter to be addressed by the criminal justice system.
In relation to “decriminalization,” detailed discussion of the unconstitu-
tionality of laws that have been ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
Court, such as “sex under false promises of marriage” or “adultery,” now 
seems practically insignificant in South Korea. However, in this writing, the 
chronological order and rationale of the several constitutional decisions 
made on the same topic will be discussed. 
This analysis is meaningful, in that one can now determine suitable 
constitutional decisions on similar moral-related topics (such as banning 
prostitution, homosexual marriage, etc.) in South Korea. This can also serve 
as comparative data12) for other countries. 
3. About this paper
There are already several advanced research studies published in 
Korean on the “2015Decision.”13) The previous studies cover the meaning 
10) Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 11 Section 1.
11) Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 10 (first sentence) “All citizens shall be 
assured of human worth and dignity and have the right to pursue happiness.”
12) For comparative legal perspective about adultery, for example, see Kuk Cho, The Crime 
of Adultery in Korea: Inadequate Means for Maintaining Morality and Protecting Women, J. Korean 
l. 2, 83-84 (2002); A. Black, & K. S. Jung, When a Revealed Affair Is a Crime, but a Hidden One Is a 
Romance: An Overview of Adultery Law in the Republic of Korea, Int’l Surv. Fam. L., 275 (2014); J. 
Corrin, It Takes Two to Tango, But Three to Commit Adultery: A Survey of the Law on Adultery in 
Post-Colonial South Pacific States, int’l. J. of laW, policy and the faMily, 26(2), 187, 219 (2012); 
anthony r. Bessette, regUlating and pUnishing adUltery in Korea and east asia, University of 
Richmond School of law (2009).
13) See Shi-Myon Ko, Heonbeobjaepansoui Hon-inbingjagan-eum Mit Gantong Deung-ui 
Wiheongyeoljeong Deung-e Natanan Bibeomjoehwaui Heuleum [De-criminalization trend in 
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and limitations of the decision of the case as well as the possibility of the 
reenactment of the adultery law due to public sentiment, the retroactive 
effect of the decision of the case, securing the evidence and realizing the 
alimony, and other subsequent work. 
Likewise, as there are plural advanced studies related to the 
“2015Decision,” at least in Korean language, I would like to focus on the 
difference in the logic of the written verdict of each judge on the topic of 
adultery. Additionally, I would like to point out the main difference in the 
logic of the “2015Decision” from those of the other four previous decisions 
that deemed the “adultery provision” of the Criminal Act (Hyeong-beob) as 
constitutional and provide reasons that back up the argument. Moreover, 
the trend is becoming stronger in society for decriminalizing controversial 
behavior (adultery, obtaining sex under false promises of marriage, 
consensual homosexual acts (“sodomy”) with military service members, 
prostitution), and topics related to the ‘free and equal status of the 
individual’ or the ‘pursuit of happiness’ brought out in the constitution are 
controversial in Korean society. Thus, the meaning of the Constitutional 
Court’s decision on unconstitutionality will be discussed.
II. The former status of the adultery regulations
 
According to the adultery regulations in Criminal Act Article 241,14) the 
Unconstitutional Decisions about the Crime of Sexual Intercourse under Pretence of Marriage and 
Adultery], 57 saBeoBhaengJeong, no. 1, 2016; Hie-Houn Lee, Heonbeobjaepansoui Gantongjoe 
Wiheon Gyeoljeong-e Daehan Pyeongseog [The Annotation of the Unconstitutional Decision against 
Criminal Conversation of the Constitutional Court], vol. 71 pUBlic land l. reV. (2015); Jong-Hyun 
Kim, Gantongjoe Wiheongyeoljeong-e Daehan Yeongu [A Study on Decision on Unconstitutionality 
of Adultery], 50 laW and society (2015); Rae-Young Kim, Gantongjoe Wiheongyeoljeong(Heonjae 
2015. 2. 26. 2009 Heonba17 deung)ui Hyolyeog [A Review of the Constitutional Court’s Unconstitutional 
Decision on the Adultery Clause(2009Hun-Ba17 etc.(consolidated), Feb 26, 2015)], 39 danKooK 
UniVersity laW JoUrnal, no. 3, 2015; Hyunah Yang, Poseuteu Gantongjoe Pyeji: Deuleonan 
Seongjeog Jayujuui Damlongwa Mudhyeojin Pihae Baeujaui Sonhae [Post-Adultery Law in Korea: A 
Feminist Law and Society Approach], 56 seoUl-daehaKgyo-BeophaK [seoUl laW JoUrnal], no. 3, 
2015.
14) Criminal Act (enacted as Act No. 293 on September 18, 1953)
Article 241 (Adultery) ① A married person who commits adultery shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not more than two years. The same shall apply to the other participant.
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subject of criminal adultery included both a married person and a person 
who had sex with the married person (though not that person’s spouse).
Therefore, in order to be considered as criminal adultery, at least one 
married person had to be involved, which means adultery was based on 
the subject’s status. “Married person” referred to a legal spouse, which 
excluded those in unregistered marriages, cohabitants.  
However, as long as the subject was legally married, it did not matter 
whether the person lived with the spouse.15) The subject was not considered 
a married person if the marriage was invalid,16) but on the other hand, 
though the request for marriage cancellation had occurred, the subject was 
considered a married person until the marriage was cancelled.17) In 
addition, it was considered that a person who was legally married according 
to foreign law was still a valid subject here.18)  
Besides, according to Criminal Act Article 241 Section 2, it was impossible 
to accuse a spouse of adultery if there had been consent in advance 
[“connivance (jong-yong)”] or an excuse following the act [“condonation 
(yu-seo)”]. First, in terms of connivance, the Supreme Court ruled, “[I]f 
there had been consent on divorce between the married couple, the consent 
includes willingness to connive at the spouse’s sexual relationship with a 
third person.”19) In other words, the Supreme Court ruled, “[I]f the married 
couple are unwilling to continue marital status and consent on divorce had 
been made, the consent includes expression of connivance with adultery of 
either spouse regardless of their legal marital status.”20) 
Moreover, regarding connivance with adultery, the Supreme Court 
ruled, “[T]he consent on divorce between the married couple does not have 
② The crime in the preceding section shall be prosecuted only upon the accusation of the 
victimized spouse. If the victimized spouse condones or pardons the adultery, accusation can 
no longer be made.
15) Supreme Court of Korea, 79Do1848, Apr. 8, 1980.
16) Supreme Court of Korea, 82Do826, Jun. 22, 1982.
17) Supreme Court of Korea, 82Do826, Jun. 22, 1982.
18) Supreme Court of Korea, 83Do41, Dec. 13, 1983.
19) Supreme Court of Korea, 68Do859, Feb. 25,1972; Supreme Court of Korea, 77Do2791, 
Oct. 11, 1977.
20) Supreme Court of Korea, 71Do2259, Jan. 31, 1972; Supreme Court of Korea, 90Do1188, 
Mar. 22, 1991.
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to be in the form of a written document. Based on several circumstances 
such as the speech and action of either spouse, when both members of the 
couple have been recognized for their unwillingness to continue marital 
status, and when the spouse truly agrees to divorce upon the other spouse’s 
request, it is considered that there had been expression of future 
connivance in case either spouse commits adultery.”21) If there had not been 
such consent, connivance is invalid even if the married couple expressed 
tentative, temporary, or conditional intention to divorce.22) 
Furthermore, in terms of condonation, the Supreme Court ruled, “[C]
ondonation of adultery can be done both explicitly and implicitly, which 
has no defined form of act. In order for behaviors or expressions reflecting 
emotions to be considered condonation, it requires the following. First, it 
requires that the person knows that the spouse had committed adultery 
and has done such investigation voluntarily. Second, regardless of knowing 
that there had been adultery of the spouse, true effort to continue the 
marital status has to be clear and be done in trustful ways.”23)
However, the precedent cases by the Supreme Court involving 
condonation of adultery had several problems. For example, there had been 
a lack of criteria to judge whether true willingness to continue the marital 
status was expressed in clear and trustful ways. The definition of knowing 
the exact date, place, and number of sexual encounters in order to be 
recognized as condonation was also unclear.
III.  Evaluating the decision of the Constitutional Court 
(“2015Decision”)
Taking into account that most of current Constitutional Court Justices 
are considered to possess a ‘strong tendency to be conservative,’24) it 
21) Supreme Court of Korea, 2006Do1759, May. 11, 2006.
22) Supreme Court of Korea, 97Do2245, Nov. 11, 1997; Supreme Court of Korea, 
90Do1188, Mar. 22, 1991.
23) Supreme Court of Korea, 99Do2149, Aug. 24, 1999; Supreme Court of Korea 
2000Do868, Jul. 7, 2000.
24) It has been mentioned by various authors that the judges of the Constitutional Court 
of Korea are to be appointed by the President or the ruling party under the current legal and 
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seemed quite surprising that seven among nine Justices decided in favor of 
unconstitutionality.
Several Justices reasoned that it is difficult to realize the common good 
of protecting the social marriage system through punishing adultery as a 
crime, while constitutional rights such as the right to sexual decision and 
freedom of privacy are over-regulated, thus the equilibrium has been lost.
1. Evaluating the majority opinion 
1)  Specifying restricted constitutional rights: to sexual self-determination and to 
privacy 
In the “2015Decision,” the majority opinion contained rulings by five 
Constitutional Court Justices: Han-Chul Park, Jin-Sung Lee, Chang-Jong 
Kim, Ki-Seog Seo, and Yong Ho Cho.25)
At the beginning, the majority opinion of the “2015Decision” had to find 
which specific constitutional rights were restricted by the provision at issue. 
And it pointed out that the provision at issue restricts the rights to sexual 
self-determination (derived from Korean Constitution Article 10) and the 
right to privacy (Article 17). In the previous four decisions related to 
adultery, it had been pointed out that the adultery provision restricts 
mainly these two constitutional rights. And this right to sexual self-
determination, which is derived from the constitutional right to human 
dignity and the right to pursue happiness (Korean CONST. Article 10 
Section 1), has already been recognized by the Constitutional Court as a 
fundamental right for a long time: “Self-determination is the premise of the 
factual conditions and therefore the judges with conservative tendencies often acquire 
overwhelming majorities in the court. One of the authors who has consistently pointed this 
out is Prof. Han. See, e.g., Sang-Hie Han, Dangerous lawyers domination: Reform the 
Constitutional Court of Korea!, Jugan-Gyeonghyang vol. 1108 (2015) http://weekly.khan.co.kr/
khnm.html?mode=view&artid=201412291812241&code=113 (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). See 
also, e.g., Jong-Cheol Kim, Heonbeopjaepansokuseuonge Kwanhan Gaesunbangahn [A Proposal for 
Reform in the Composition of the Constitutional Court], HEONBEOPHAK-YEONKU [STUDIES ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW], Vol. 11 No. 2 9-48, 2005 (in Korean).
25) For the English spellings of the name of the judges, see http://english.ccourt.go.kr/
cckhome/eng/decisions/majordecisions/majorDetail.do (last visited Dec. 19, 2015. I followed 
the example of the English version of [Case on Prohibition of Nighttime Access to Online Games by 
Juveniles], Constitutional Court of Korea, Apr. 24, 2014, 2011Hun-Ma659, 683 (Consolidated)).
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personality right and the individual’s right to pursue happiness. And this 
includes sexual self-determination to determine whether to have sex or not 
and which sexual partner to have sex with … .”26) 
2)  Regarding the majority opinion made by the Constitutional Court that 
criminal adultery regulations violate the Principle of Proportionality
Any restriction on the fundamental rights and the legitimate interest 
which is to be protected by such restriction shall be subjected to the 
proportionality test. The principle of proportionality was first established in 
German law,27) and today it is generally accepted by many constitutional 
courts in the world,28) including the Korean one. In Korea, it is generally 
agreed that the proportionality test as the constitutional principle is 
included in the Article 37 Section 2 of the Korean Constitution.29) According 
to the wording of Article 37 Section 2, this is a principle that can be applied 
to any restriction of fundamental rights.30) The principle means that any 
restriction on the fundamental rights and the legitimate interest which is to 
be protected by such restriction shall be proportionate in the following 
26) Constitutional Court of Korea, 89Hun-Ma82, Sep. 10, 1990; Constitutional Court of 
Korea, 99Hun-Ba40, Oct. 31, 2002; Constitutional Court of Korea, 2008Hun-Ba58, Nov. 26, 
2009.
27) In the late 19th century, the proportionality test was first developed in the High State 
Administrative Courts (Oberlandesgericht) in Germany, to review actions by the police. The 
German Constitutional Court(Bundesverfassungsgericht), which was established in 1951, 
transferred this test into constitutional law and applied it to laws limiting fundamental rights. 
The first decision that mentions the principle of proportionality concerns an election law of 
the state of North Rhine Westphalia, see Decision of the German Constitutional Court, 
BVerfGE 3, 383 at 399 (1954).
28) See e.g. Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why everywhere but here, 
22 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L., 2011 at 291; Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German 
constitutional jurisprudence, 57.2 U. of Toronto L. J., 2007 at 383-384.
29) About the Proportionality Test of Korean Constitutional Court, see e.g. Chee-Youn 
Hwang, Critics on the Constitutional Complaint against the Ordinary Courts’ Judgments in Terms of 
Balancing and Proportionality Test in Korean Constitutional Review, 18(2) MIGUCKHEONBEOB-YEONKU 
[STUDIES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTION] 2007 at 271, 292 (especially, chapter IX: “Proportionality 
Test as the Rule against Excessive Restriction“).
30) In Germany, it took until 1963 for the German Constitutional Court to recognize the 
applicability of the principle in all cases where fundamental freedoms are infringed (BVerfGE 
16, 194 at 201 (1963)). Another two years passed before the Court explained where it finds the 
textual basis for the principle. See Grimm, supra note 28, at 385.
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manner: (1) The purpose should be legitimate (Legitimacy of Purpose), (2) 
the means should be appropriate (Appropriateness), (3) the restriction 
should be minimized (Minimal Restriction) and (4) legal interests should be 
balanced (Balance of Legal Interest). 
As to the ‘Legitimacy of Purpose’, the majority opinion of the 
“2015Decision” ruled, “The provision at issue intends to promote the 
marriage system based on good sexual morality and monogamy and to 
preserve marital fidelity between spouses, and its legislative purpose is 
legitimate.”31) And in terms of this ‘legitimate purpose examination’, there 
seems no clear objection among other judges to the majority opinion of the 
“2015Decision” that the legislative purpose was legitimate.
As to the other three sub-principles, the majority opinion argued quite 
in detail as follows. It argued that “the recent rapid dispersal of individualism 
and sexual openness has caused changes of awareness about marriage and 
sex. Sex and love should not be controlled by criminal sanctions, they 
should rather be the responsibility of the individuals. Although the act of 
abandoning the responsibility to be virtuous is immoral, it is hardly 
something to be punished by law. Furthermore, meeting and engaging in 
sexual intercourse at free will pertains to individual freedom. Though 
immoral, it belongs to individual life and the negative effect on the society 
is not so critical. Therefore the modern trend in the Criminal Act is that 
without definitive violation of the specific benefit and protection of the law, 
intervention by national authorities should not occur.”32) The majority 
opinion made a further important point: “Besides the fact that adultery 
requires a complaint from the victim for prosecution, exercising the right to 
accuse someone is possible only after the marriage has been dissolved or a 
divorce suit has been filed. This would eventually lead to the breakdown of 
the affected family.”33) The opinion mentioned that even if the accusation 
was recanted, it is unlikely that the couple would ever recover emotionally. 
Therefore, adultery does not contribute to the protection of the marital 
system nor promote the concept of family. “Moreover it is unlikely that the 
31) See the majority opinion (“unconstitutional”) of the five judges in the “2015Decision” 
(Constitutional Court of Korea, 2009Hun-Ba 17, 205 (consolidated), Feb., 26, 2016).
32) Id.
33) Id.
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offender would want to reunite with the spouse, and due to the worsened 
spousal relationship the family bond would be shattered. There has been a 
lack of research showing the preventive effect of adultery criminalization 
by analyzing the realities of law enforcement, and no statistical data has 
demonstrated that the countries that have abolished adultery criminalization 
have more corruption of sexual morality or higher divorce rates than 
before.”34) 
Thus, according to this major opinion, adultery criminalization is 
unconvincing as a preventive measure to keep families together, which in 
terms of criminal policy suggests that general and special prevention effects 
cannot be expected with such measures. Moreover, according to this major 
opinion, “Also following the accusation of a spouse for adultery, future 
divorce would be assumed, meaning that women who cannot support 
themselves economically would feel rather uncomfortable with the 
outcome of the accusation. Therefore, nowadays adultery criminalization 
itself has largely lost its function of protecting married women. It now 
penalizes only a handful of those who actually commit adultery, rather 
producing potential criminals as it restricts their basic rights and losing its 
effectiveness in protecting the marital system and spousal fidelity.”35)
In conclusion, this opinion argues the following: “Marriage and the 
family bond should depend on the free will and love of the individuals 
rather than being forced through punishment. The regulation on criminal 
adultery, which punishes the act of adultery in order to protect good sexual 
customs and marital monogamy and facilitate spousal fidelity, violates the 
Appropriateness and Minimal Restriction Principle within the Principle of 
Proportionality. Based on the criminal adultery punishment regulation, 
protection of marital monogamy and spousal fidelity for the common 
benefit cannot be fulfilled, while the criminal adultery punishment regulation 
assumes individual privacy as punishable by law. This exceedingly limits 
individual rights to sexual decision making, privacy, and freedom, and 
ultimately the criminal adultery punishment regulation violates the Balance 
34) Id.
35) See the majority opinion of the five judges in the “2015Decision” (Constitutional Court 
of Korea, 2009Hun-Ba 17, 205 (consolidated), Feb., 26, 2016).
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of Legal Interest principle within the Principle of Proportionality.”36)
3) Review
(1)  Regarding the legitimacy of the legislative purpose of criminal adultery 
regulations
It seems that the legitimate purpose examination in balancing and 
proportionality test of Korean Constitutional Court is criticized as 
superficial. If one could put aside that criticism, and so far as one follow the 
existing legitimate purpose examination’s logic of the court, the purpose of 
adultery “… to promote the marriage system based on good sexual 
morality and monogamy and to preserve marital fidelity between 
spouses”37) might be legitimate. And one can admit that the punishment of 
criminal adultery serves its own legitimate purposes.38) 
(2) Regarding other sub-principles of the Principle of Proportionality
In addition, based on the “2015Decision,” in which five Constitutional 
Court Justices ruled that the criminal adultery punishment regulation 
violates the Principle of Proportionality, adultery is an act of immorality. 
According to a recent survey, it is no longer clear whether the majority of 
Koreans support the idea that criminal adultery should be punishable by 
law.39) Nowadays, it is clear that Koreans have become more open-minded 
towards sex and that they do not consider the act of adultery to arouse 
anger or repulsion, promoting the idea that adultery is no longer an evil act 
to be punishable by the Criminal Act. 
In addition, according to the Constitution of Korea, the limitation of 
fundamental rights should comply with the conditions of Article 37 Section 
36) Id.
37) Id.
38) For reference, the decision which struck down the Criminal Act Article to punish 
‘obtaining sex under false promises of marriage’ denied also the legitimacy of the purpose of 
the legislation. It was one of those rare cases in which the Constitutional Court denied the 
legitimacy of the purpose of the act. See Constitutional Court of Korea, 2008 Hun-
Ba58·2009Hun-Ba191, Nov. 26, 2009.
39) A recent survey of Korea Women’s Development Institute (KWDI) showed 60.4% of 
those questioned were in favour of maintaining the punishment of adultery, and it shows that 
about 60% of adult citizens appeared to be in favour of maintaining the punishment.
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2.40) It has been pointed out that, as to regulating adultery by the Criminal 
Act, maintaining the order of “sexual morality” as a purpose to regulate 
sexual decisions made by individuals is an invalid point based on the 
Constitution Article 37 Section 2, since it arguably does not fall within the 
specified categories of this constitutional provision. 41)
Furthermore, “sexual morality” can become either more conservative or 
more liberal, meaning that it is flexible and changeable depending on the 
times. As long as the sexual customs and culture do not go against positive 
norms of human rights, members of the society should be able to freely 
decide and voluntarily comply at the level of common morality and ethics. 
Such customs and culture should not be regulated by law.42) Rather than 
viewing it as punishable by criminal law, it is more appropriate to view it 
as an area of moral criticism.  
Besides, according to the German Federal Constitutional Court, taking 
state measures to advance the morality of the citizens is irrational.43) 
Moreover, the traditional family structure and the role/position of each 
family member have changed, and our country today is experiencing a 
rapid growth of individualism and greater sexual openness, which in 
return changes the awareness about marriage and sex. Sex and love cannot 
be regulated by punishment; it has to be the responsibility of individuals. 
Violating the responsibility of spousal fidelity is immoral, yet it is not 
punishable by law. 
In terms of the pursuit of happiness, today’s society increasingly values 
the ability to freely exercise rights to sexual decision making more than it 
values the maintenance of traditional sexual morality and protection of 
spousal fidelity. This shows the changes in the structure of our society, 
changes in the awareness of the people about marriage and sex, and the 
tendency to value rights to sexual decision making. These all demonstrate 
that it is hard to judge whether a married person having sexual intercourse 
40) Hunbeop [Constitution of the Republic of Korea] Article 37 Section 2: “Freedoms and 
rights of citizens may be restricted by the Act only when necessary for national security, 
maintenance of law and order or for public welfare. Even when such restriction is imposed, 
essential aspects of the freedom or right shall not be violated.”
41) See KWang seoK cheon, heonBeoBpanlyeyeongU 226 (2000); Lee, supra note 13, at 431.
42) See Cho, supra note 12, at 92. 
43) BVerfGE 22, 180.
338 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 15: 325
with a person other than his/her spouse should be punished by criminal 
law and that there has been little consensus among the people. Based on the 
above reasons, it is more legitimate to treat adultery as a matter of morality 
than a matter that can be regulated by criminal law, and the criminal law 
imposing a penalty on the act of adultery is unsuitable. 
Moreover, assuming that the purpose of criminal adultery regulations is 
to “maintain spousal fidelity,” criminal punishment by the country, which 
is a form of physical power, should not be used, but the free decision has to 
be fundamentally given to the married couples themselves. The former 
imposes exceedingly strict regulations on the rights to sexual decision 
making, such as sexual intercourse and the right of decision, and thus, 
criminal punishment for spousal fidelity is inappropriate.
When comparing punishing and not punishing a married person who is 
involved in adultery, it is questionable whether punishment improves 
spousal fidelity, prevents the act itself due to the fear of punishment, 
reunites spouses and increases sexual faithfulness, and serves to protect the 
marriage and family system. It is hard to prove its effectiveness, because it 
relies heavily on sentimental arguments, idealism, common sense, and 
intuition.44)
Most cases of adultery are left undiscovered by the spouse, and even if 
it is discovered, the rate of criminal suits is quite low. Based on recent 
statistics, the number of incidents being reported or prosecuted has 
decreased. The rate of imprisonment is less than 10% of the total suits filed. 
During the inspection and the process of hearing, many cases are dropped, 
as authorities end up refusing to prosecute. This shows how the role of 
criminal punishment has been greatly weakened, and based on this, the 
five constitutional Justices ruled in the “2015Decision” that the criminal 
adultery punishment regulation violates the Method Appropriateness in 
the Principle of Proportionality, and the case was legitimate in terms of the 
Constitution.    
In addition, when any spouse commits adultery, rather than punishing 
the person for criminal adultery, which would only cause more damage, it 
44) See Chan-hee Shinlee, gantongjoe, yeoseong-ui gwon-ig-eul bohohaneun beob-i anida 
[Adultery is not the law that protects women], vol. 422 National Assembly Rev. [gughoebo] 84 
(2001). 
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would be more beneficial to require them to compensate the victim for lost 
property and pain and suffering and grant a divorce based on the civil law. 
Such civil penalties imposed on the person who committed adultery would 
encourage spousal fidelity, unlike the criminal adultery punishment 
regulation that violates the Principle of Minimal Restriction. 
Moreover, according to the Constitution Article 36 Section 1, the 
marriage and family system needs to be established and maintained based 
on individual dignity and gender equality, which is guaranteed by the 
country. The criminal procedure against the person who committed 
adultery would prevent the recovery of the relationship between the 
married couple and cause early breakdown of the marital relationship. It 
would make reunion impossible and worsen the marital relationship due to 
the need to investigate the adultery in order to accuse the spouse.45) It 
would also have detrimental effects on the lives of children,46) increase the 
number of marriages that end in divorce, and punish those who attempt to 
form new marriage relationships and do not file for divorce ahead of time 
while prematurely involved in sexual intercourse. This only creates 
husbands/wives or fathers/mothers with criminal records.47)
The affected persons would not be protected by the marriage and family 
system guaranteed by the Constitution Article 36 Section 1. Instead, they 
would experience more obstacles and even face the dissolution of new 
marital and family relationships. Therefore, criminal adultery regulations 
violate the Constitution Article 36 Section 1 by failing to guarantee the 
marital and family system, and they do not protect spousal fidelity. They 
rather subject individuals’ private sexual lives to criminal punishment and 
limit their basic rights to individual sexual decision making. In these 
aspects, it is constitutionally legitimate in the “2015Decision” that the five 
Justices ruled that the criminal adultery punishment regulation violates the 
Principle of Minimal Restriction in the Principle of Proportionality. 
In addition, the criminal adultery punishment regulation is unlikely to 
effectively inhibit the act of adultery, which was thought to be the function 
of the regulation, if the reason that a married person commits adultery is 
45) Cheon, supra note 41, at 288; Lee, supra note 13, at 433.
46) Shinlee, supra note 44, at 83.
47) Lee, supra note 13, at 433.
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based on love with a person other than the spouse. On the other hand, 
when the reason that a married person commits adultery is based on 
something other than love (e.g., engaging in prostitution to satisfy curiosity, 
keep up with the entertainment routine prevailing in one’s social life, or 
satisfy sexual desire),48) many feel that such behavior is acceptable as long 
as it remains hidden.49) The criminal punishment of adultery when applied 
to a relationship not based on love can neither be expected to prevent the 
act of adultery nor be effective in terms of general and special prevention. 
Due to the preceding reasons, on the “2015Decision,” one could 
disagree with the claim made by Justice Yi-Su Kim that “there are three 
types of adultery.” These include “those involving sexual intercourse 
outside of marriage for basic sexual pleasure (type 1); those involving 
individuals who met persons more attractive than their current spouse, 
became skeptical about the current marriage, and fell in love with the new 
person (type 2); and those involving the practical breakdown of the 
marriage by living separately followed by having sexual intercourse with 
someone other than the spouse (type 3). Among the three types of adultery, 
the first two are different from the third, in that the third is more prone to 
moral criticism and shows a greater need to keep the marital status intact. 
Therefore, criminal regulations on such cases are still needed. Types 1 and 2 
have proven to be preventable through the power of law enforcement, such 
as imprisonment, which is the only type of court penalty, followed by the 
procedural burdens coming from inspections and court trials and the fear 
of losing one’s job. The adultery regulation for types 1 and 2 can be an 
effective tool to bring forth the true regret and self-reflection of the person 
who committed adultery, after which, in some cases, legal proceedings are 
cancelled in the process. This would possibly allow the recovery of the 
48) Korea’s Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) Korea surveyed 1,632 
adults (age of 20’s~50’s and M/F) about culture and notion of sex in 2008. According to the 
survey report, the motive of sex buyers is alcohol (54.4%), curiosity (33.1%), sexual desire 
(21.8%), colleague’s solicitation (16.8%), entertaining custom (14.4%), stress relief (3.7%), army 
enlistment (1.5%).
49) From August 1. 2006 till September 5. 2006, MOGEF surveyed 1,573 citizens about sex 
purchase experience. According the survey report, 44.3% had never purchased sex, 40% had 
ever purchased less than 3 times, 8.8% had ever purchased 4~6 times, 2.5% had ever 
purchased 7~9 times, and 4.4% had ever purchased more than 10 times. Compared to the sex 
purchase non-experienced group, sex purchase experienced group is bigger (56.7%).
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scarred marital relationship.”  
Moreover, in relation to the “2015Decision” that the criminal regulation 
of adultery is unconstitutional, one could disagree with the claim made by 
Justice Ilwon Kang that “the acts of adultery and incest occur due to 
individual sexual decisions, which belong to the area of private life. 
Nevertheless, if such behaviors have destructive effects on the marital 
relationship, they do not simply belong to the ethical and moral level but 
gain the rationale for regulation by law.” Actually, these two opinions are 
not consistent with the logical flow of the major opinion. Thus, it seems that 
each of the two Justices had to write their own separate (concurring) 
opinions. 
One would also disagree with the claims of the dissenting opinion made 
by Justices Jung-Mi Lee and Chang-Ho Ahn that “the act of adultery 
between a married person and the other party not only deviates from the 
social ethical suitableness but also nearly dissolves marriage and family or 
puts it at risk. Thus, it is difficult to perceive the act only at the level of 
ethics and morality.” Therefore, in this regard, this dissenting opinion 
claims that contrary to the majority opinion, “It is hard to completely 
disagree with the function of criminal law when it comes to maintaining 
good social sexual morality. Moreover, when it comes to protecting 
ordinary housewives who have little social experience and are economically 
and socially disadvantaged members in the family, often times due to the 
concealed property of their spouses, property division law is ineffective, 
and the amount of consolation money is nearly insignificant. Our society 
still needs to punish adultery because the current civil law system or court 
service cannot support them, and various systems to protect economically 
and socially disadvantaged people are missing. In particular, issues remain 
to be resolved, such as recognizing property division during marriage, 
regulating one-sided residential property sellouts, ensuring the right to 
rescind fraudulent acts in order to protect the right to property division 
requests, guaranteeing inheritance following the divorce, and many more.”
2. Regarding concurring opinion
Despite the fact that seven Justices commonly concluded that adultery is 
unconstitutional at last, two among the seven (Yi-Su Kim and Ilwon Kang) 
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had different reasons to back up the conclusion. 
1) Regarding Yi-Su Kim’s opinion
Justice Yi-Su Kim claimed that “the majority of general public still feel 
that punishment regulation against adultery is needed,”50) articulating a 
different view from the other five Justices who mentioned the changes in 
social awareness. He admitted that adultery punishment regulation has 
preventive benefits and allows recovery of the marital relationship. 
Furthermore, he believed such measures can be useful for socially 
disadvantaged women when they request for alimony after the divorce. 
However, in Kim’s view, it is unconstitutional because of the following. 
First, it is totally unnecessary to punish various types of adulterers and the 
other party in a uniform way. In particular, adultery in the case of a legally 
married couple undergoing long-term separation should be considered 
differently since their marriage has been already practically shattered.51) 
Second, in this case, it is also problematic when it comes to punishing 
the other party for adultery. If the other party is legally single, not only 
must individual rights be protected, but also no such responsibility for 
spousal fidelity exists in the first place. Punishment of such person is 
considered the abuse of the state’s administrative power.52)
2)  Regarding Ilwon Kang’s opinion: the point that criminal adultery 
regulations violate the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, and if punished 
solely by imprisonment it is unconstitutional 
Justice Ilwon Kang backed up his conclusion of unconstitutionality with 
arguing that the applicable range of adultery is ambiguous. He explained 
that “during the initiation of the criminal adultery punishment regulation, 
when a married person connives or condones the adultery of the spouse, a 
lawsuit cannot be filed against the spouse nor can the spouse be punished. 
However, the criteria with which to judge whether connivance or condona-
tion has been made are unclear. On the other hand, based on the Supreme 
Court’s ruling on March 22, 1991 regarding the 90-do 1188 case, on July 10, 
50) See Kim’s concurring opinion in the same 2015Decision.
51) Id. (Justice Yi-Su Kim, concurring opinion).
52) Id. (Justice Yi-Su Kim, concurring opinion).
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2008 regarding the 2008-do 3599 case, on September 12, 1989 regarding the 
89-do 501 case, on July 9, 2009 regarding the 2008-do 984 case, and on 
November 20, 2014 regarding the 2011-mu 2997 case, it is difficult to judge 
when unambiguous and complete consent on divorce has been made or 
when tentative or conditional willingness to divorce has been expressed.”53)
He also claimed the following: “If one argues that adultery does not 
apply when cohabitation of the married couple is at an unrecoverable state, 
most of the general public that have less expertise in law would have little 
idea on the true degree of the unrecoverable state, nor would they be able 
to estimate to what extent they would have to know about the details of 
adultery. Moreover, it would be difficult to grasp to which extent the 
willingness to sustain the marital relationship should be expressed.” 54) 
Ultimately, in this flow of logic, it is hard for the general public to 
clearly determine whether condonation has been made on adultery until 
each element is reviewed based on the precedent cases. Therefore, what 
constitutes criminal adultery is clear, yet the passive accusation requirement 
of connivance and condonation is unclear, in which the latter violates the 
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, according to Justice Kang.
Moreover, he argued that even with various forms of adultery, impris-
onment as a sole punishment violates the Principle of Proportionality. He had 
pointed out that imposing only imprisonment on various types of criminal 
adultery eliminates the balance between the degree of the crime and the 
weight of the punishment, as it deviates from the practical Principle of the 
Constitutional State. Once found guilty of adultery, as long as the case does 
not conclude as a “stay of execution” or “suspension of sentence,” the 
majority of the cases impose short-term punishments of restrictions of 
physical freedom. This raises issues such as the brand effect and malignant 
infection during the process of law enforcement, yet it has little reforming 
effects. “For such reasons Austria now prefers a monetary penalty over a 
punishment of restricting physical freedom. Likewise, England has 
replaced the punishment of restricting physical freedom with a social 
volunteering and probation system. In our case, requiring imprisonment 
for up to two years is out of the international legislative trend while it 
53) See Kang’s concurring opinion in the same 2015Decision.
54) Id. (Justice Ilwon Kang, concurring opinion).
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violates the Principle of Proportionality between responsibility and 
punishment.”55)
3) Review
First, the constitutional “Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine” means that the 
basic laws for the people are to be drafted in language such that when it is 
unclear for the average person to comprehend, the law should be voided. 
Due to this doctrine, the crime composition requirement subject to criminal 
punishment needs to be precisely defined with a literal meaning, according 
to the principle of nulla poena sine lege.
However, the crime composition requirement being clearly defined 
does not imply that in the process of implementing the law, judgment of 
value should be completely excluded nor does it require it to be a colorless 
descriptive concept. Even if the concept would need additional interpretation 
by the judge, by ordinary means of interpretation prohibiting arbitrariness, 
it implies that the content can be written in a way that it is easy to com-
prehend. 
In light of this Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, regarding the 
“2015Decision,” the Constitutional Court Justice Ilwon Kang ruled that the 
criminal adultery punishment regulation violates the Void-for-Vagueness 
Doctrine, explaining that the lexical definition of “connivance” is “to 
explain thoroughly, appease and suggest,” while the lexical definition of 
“condonation” is “to generously forgive” or “to express feelings of over-
looking an offense.” 
The Supreme Court ruled that “if the married couple does not intend to 
continue their marital relationship and has fully shown agreement on 
divorce, even if they are still legally married, prior consent is implied.”56) 
Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled, “If the divorce agreement has been 
made internally, such as when the married couple wants to divorce by 
mutual agreement and live separately, or when the declaration of divorce 
has been signed, regardless of whether the couple is legally married, they 
have expressed that sexual intercourse with a third party would be 
55) Id. (Justice Ilwon Kang, concurring opinion).
56) Supreme Court of Korea, 77Do2701, Oct. 11, 1977; Supreme Court of Korea, 
2006Do1759, May. 11, 2006.
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connived.”57)  
Lastly, it was ruled that “although the couple has not divorced yet, if the 
communal life has practically been destroyed and become unrecoverable, if 
there was a third party sexually involved with one of the spouses, it cannot 
be considered infringement or interruption of communal life. Furthermore, 
there is no rationale to claim that there had been infringement of the right 
to communal life, upon which it can be reasoned that no illegal act has been 
done.”58) If the marriage has reached the point where practical communal 
life is nonexistent, adultery does not violate social common standards that 
are generally accepted in terms of social ethics, as it is prone to being seen 
as illegal. Nevertheless, in the case where there is little possibility of social 
criticism, it does not violate social common standards.59) Thus, regarding 
various types of adultery, it is possible that the judge can interpret the 
concepts of connivance and condonation appropriately so that they can be 
applied in order to rule the defendant innocent, or they can be alleviated so 
that only a suspended sentence or probation can be imposed.
Therefore, in order to punish the adulterer by criminal punishment, it is 
necessary to widen the definition of connivance and condonation. Even if 
the concepts of connivance and condonation in the criminal adultery 
punishment regulation requires additional interpretation by the judge, by a 
general method of interpretation that excludes arbitrariness, the content of 
connivance and condonation can be easily comprehended.60) Therefore, in 
relation to the “2015Decision,” the claim made by Constitutional Court 
Justice Ilwon Kang that the criminal adultery punishment regulation 
violates the Void-of-Vagueness Doctrine is disagreeable.
As to whether the adultery regulations in Criminal Act Article 241 
having imprisonment as its sole means of punishment violate the Principle 
of Proportionality between responsibility and punishment, the upper 
bound of criminal adultery punishment is up to two years of imprisonment. 
57) Supreme Court of Korea, 95Do2819, Feb. 25, 1997.
58) Supreme Court of Korea, 71Do2259, Jan. 31, 1972.; 2006Do1759, May. 11, 2006; 
2011Meu2997, Nov. 20, 2014.
59) In the same decision (“2015Decision”), the dissenting opinion of two judges (Jung-Mi 
Lee and Chang-Ho Ahn) pointed this out, too.
60) See Lee, supra note 13 at 438.
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It has been pointed out that this is relatively less burdensome, taking into 
account that the less serious act of adultery can even be probated. In 
addition, if a monetary penalty were implemented, this would still be 
ineffective at general and special prevention through legal threatening, 
especially if the married person committed adultery in order to avoid the 
duty of support or compensation for damages.  
In addition, it had been pointed out that a monetary penalty, which is 
relatively less burdensome than imprisonment, has been recognized as a 
form of indemnity or conscience money. Adultery is more of an unethical 
crime rather than one based on profit acquisition. Therefore, a monetary 
penalty is unsuitable for penalizing adultery, and it can be abused by those 
who are economically well off by allowing them to indulge.61)
By following these logical flows, one would eventually at least disagree 
with the claim made by the Constitutional Court Justice Ilwon Kang that 
imprisonment as the sole means of punishment violates the Principle of 
Proportionality between responsibility and punishment. 
  
3. Regarding the dissenting opinion
Although unexpectedly many Justices ruled the criminalization of 
adultery as unconstitutional, Jung-Mi Lee and Chang-Ho Ahn still argued 
views to the contrary. They refuted the claim that adultery violates the right 
to sexual decision, by explaining that “it is hardly agreeable because 
adultery is an act of violating spousal fidelity by a married person who 
chose to take such responsibility to start with, and it denies the community 
that protects the marriage.”62) According to their explanation, adultery is 
beyond the act concerning one’s own domain. It is an invasion of others’ 
benefits. 
They also reasoned that adultery can severely threaten marital 
monogamy, which serves as a basis for marital system, and that it causes 
various social problems. The Justices emphasized that “From Ancient 
Chosun’s Eight Article Law until now adultery has been prohibited and 
punished, and consequently the general public has recognized adultery as 
61) Id.
62) See Lee and Ahn’s dissenting opinion in the same 2015Decision.
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punishable. This general notion has resulted in preventive effects for 
adultery.”63)
As to the imprisonment as a sole punishment, they considered it valid 
in that “the upper bound of its legal penalty is relatively low” and “less 
serious acts of adultery have even possibility of suspended sentences.”64)
We can easily find that this dissenting opinion mainly follows the 
rationale of the majority opinions of the previous four decisions that had 
ruled the criminalization of adultery as constitutional. The rationale had 
been ‘maintaining spousal fidelity’ and ‘protecting women through 
criminal adultery.’65) The majority opinions of the past decisions have, 
however, dwindled to become the opinion of the minority(dissenting 
opinion) in the 2015Decision.
We should also notice a small controversial issue that, though this 
dissenting opinion of the 2015Decision mentioned that adultery had been 
prohibited and punished in Ancient Chosun’s Eight Article Law, only three 
of these articles have been clearly recognized by the mainstream of 
historians and the adultery article is not included in this three.66)
4. Interim Conclusion
My consequent opinion on this decision is the following. The rationale 
underlying the criminal adultery punishment regulation that it protects 
good sexual customs and marital monogamy and moreover facilitates 
spousal fidelity is agreeable. However, our country today has witnessed an 
expansion of individualism and sexual openness, believing that sex and 
love should not be regulated by the state but be left within the responsibility 
of the individual. Although adultery is immoral, ultimately it belongs 
within the realm of individual privacy. Therefore, the country should not 
be prosecuting criminal adultery in order to secure spousal fidelity, but 
63) Id.
64) Id.
65) See the majority opinion of 1990Decision, the 1993Decision, 2001Decision and the 
2008Decision.
66) The other five can be only found in “Hwandangogi,” which has been regarded as a 
forgery by mainstream of historians.
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rather, based on individual freedom, leave the issue to the free will of the 
married couple. In this respect, criminal adultery regulation exceedingly 
invades freedom of privacy and therefore is unconstitutional.  
Furthermore, when either spouse commits adultery, according to the 
divorce conditions based on the Civil Act Article 840 Section 1, the 
adulterer has to compensate for the resulting property and mental loss 
based on the Civil Act Article 843 and Article 804, and the court would 
restrict child custody and visitation rights in order to protect the welfare of 
the child so that these civil disadvantages would be given to the adulterer 
who would then feel more responsible for spousal fidelity based on the 
Civil Act Article 843, Article 837 Section 3 and 4, Article 837 Section 2.
Despite the common benefit of protecting spousal fidelity, the majority 
of people believe that adultery barely harms society, and thus rather than 
the state’s power of imposing criminal punishment in order to inhibit or 
prevent adultery, it is more reasonable to let the free will and love of the 
married couple decide whether to maintain the marriage and family. Such 
benefit and protection of the law has to be considered at the level of 
morality. 
According to the report by Korean Women’s Policy Research Organi-
zation, a survey was taken in June 2014 targeting 2000 adults from both 
genders regarding adultery, in which the analysis revealed that 36.9% of 
the male respondents had experienced adultery during marriage, while 
65.6% of female respondents had experienced adultery during marriage. Of 
the total, 23.6% of the respondents had experienced adultery that can be 
punished by law, which corresponded to 32.2% of male respondents and 
14.4% of female respondents. In sum, the organization concluded that 
based on the survey results adultery is no longer a rare phenomenon. Such 
recent survey data and reports reveal that in fact adultery is prevalent in 
our society while a very low percentage had been penalized, thus leading 
to the conclusion that criminal punishment of the act of adultery and incest 
generates little general or special preventive effect. 
Thus the regulation no longer fulfills its intended function of protecting 
marriage and family and facilitating spousal fidelity, while conversely the 
punishment tears apart marital relationships, leading to divorce and the 
breakdown of the family, and unnecessarily increases the number of 
criminals, which violates the Constitution Article 36 Section 1, the 
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protection of marriage and family system. In addition, since divorce 
constitutes a precondition for accusing one’s spouse of adultery, criminal 
punishment in fact fosters the dissolution of families, and therefore 
arguably violates the constitutional protection of marriage and the family 
system. Criminal adultery regulation violates the principle of proportionality 
and the individual right to sexual decision-making and invades the right to 
privacy. Therefore it is unconstitutional. 
For the preceding reasons, the ‘2015Decision’ that adultery regulation is 
unconstitutional is thus constitutionally legitimate. 
 
5. Consequences of the Decision and Retroactivity
1) Consequences
The decision of the case has brought enormous impact to Korean 
society, and currently, the arguments for and against the decision are being 
debated. If one wants to know the opinions of persons who may represent 
different positions by way of example, they are as follows. Park, a civil 
activist and president of the cooperative office in the People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy, claimed that the state should not intervene in the 
problems of couples by means of penalty.67) Moreover, the United Women’s 
Association provided the following opinion through reviews: “[T]he 
decision from the Constitutional Court to rule the criminal regulation of 
adultery as unconstitutional should be respected since it lacked actual effect 
until now.”68) Professor Young-Su Chang of the Korea University law 
school also advised that “in the long-term, it is right to deem the criminal 
regulation of adultery unconstitutional” and that “setting the case study of 
developed countries as a model for solving the adultery problem through 
67) He stated that it is rather more righteous for the state to ask for civil liability, and he 
commented, “[I]t is justified from the viewpoint of the judicial perspective and the flow of the 
times.” See Sejun Park et al., (gantongjoe wiheon) “sidae byeonhwa injeonghaeya” “gajeong 
haecheㆍgigang bung goe [(Adultery is Unconstitutional) “Era’s change to admit” “Demolition of 
family and collapse of discipline”], World Daily [segyeilbo], Feb. 26, 2015, http://www.segye.
com/content/html/2015/02/26/20150226004864.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
68) Id. (United Women’s Association, in its comment) The association also stated, “[E]ven 
though the adultery law is abolished, the moral and ethical responsibility agreed to by the 
couple does not necessarily disappear, and there should be an amendment requiring the 
partner to bear the civil liability from imputation.”
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civil law would be a desirable way toward a solution.”69) However, 
Sungkyunkwan University’s Confucian scholar Seo-Chan Ryu responded 
differently, arguing, “[I]t is desirable that the state should be the arbitrator 
for penalizing the adultery crime.”70) Conversely, Dr. Ha from the Christian 
Association (Korea Association of Christian Family Counseling) mentioned 
that “abolishing the adultery crime has a considerable relationship with 
social and domestic problems, and therefore, there is a higher possibility 
that abolishment of the criminal regulation of adultery may lead to negative 
results, such as less attention for dysfunctional family problems.”71)
On the other hand, in order to analyze the changes in the perceptions of 
the general public based on gender after the decision on the case, one recent 
poll72) conducted a comparison of male and female respondents after the 
abolishment of the criminal regulation of adultery.73) At the executive level, 
the National Assembly or the Ministry of Justice did not show any tangible 
movement or discussion on any measures related to the gap created from 
the abolished space. In addition, if it was abandoned, the consequence of 
weakening marriage ties had been worried, and the retrial case from the 
decision triggered debate on human rights issues as private information of 
the involved person and the related people leaked out during the process. 
Finally, issues had been raised from the decision of the case regarding the 
wider scope for the Korean court to select the breakdown principle, but 
recently, the Supreme Court maintained the principle of liability with a 
unanimous vote.74) In addition, a study argued75) that we should move 
69) Id. (Young-Su Chang, in his comment)
70) Id. (Seo-Chan Ryu, in his comment)
71) He further added, “[R]ather than complete dissolution of the adultery law, an 
alternative method of amendment should be employed according to the times.” Id. (Hyeon-
Cheol Ha, in his comment)
72) Jinho Shin, [2015 Adultery Report], Seoul News [seoulsinmun], Sep. 16, 2015, http://
www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20150916500037 (last visited Dec. 16, 2015).
73) Id. The results showed that 24.2% of married people had experienced extramarital 
affairs, which was 2.8% higher than when the Korean Women’s Development Institute 
researched the same topic eight months before the abolishment of the criminal regulation of 
adultery. http://www.fnnews.com/news/201502261520510963 (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
74) Supreme Court of Korea, 2013Meu568, Sep. 15, 2015.
75) Do-Jin Og, wiheongyeoljeong hu gantong-e daehan minsa chaeg-im [Civil liability after 
decision of constitutional violation on adultery punishment], Vol. 450 INGWONGWA JEONG-UI 
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henceforth the discussion centered on not ‘criminal characteristic’ of 
adultery but illegal breach of marriage contract. In other words, adultery is 
just one type of breach, as he pointed out. This argument seems proper and 
reasonable.
2) Retroactive Effect Issue
As the decision concluded, the crime of adultery (Criminal Act Article 
241) is now unconstitutional. The criminal law clause lost its effect 
retroactively. But the past judgments of the criminal court based on the 
clause, which were decided until October 30, 2008, remain valid.  In other 
words, only the defendants who were convicted by the criminal courts after 
October 30, 2008 (the day when the clause was last held by the Constitutional 
Court as constitutional) could be found innocent through retrial. This is 
because the proviso of Article 47 Section 3, which limits the retroactive 
effect of decisions on unconstitutionality to a certain time, stipulating the 
cut-off point as the latest date when the Constitutional Court last upheld 
the same challenged statue as constitutional. The proviso was newly 
enacted on May 20, 2014.
The aim to legislate the proviso was to avoid an excessive burden on 
legal stability and on the judicial branch. Criminal courts had experienced 
overwhelming numbers of retrial cases as a result of unconstitutionality 
before. That experience was caused by the decision of the Constitutional 
Court which struck down Criminal Act Article to punish ‘obtaining sex 
under false promises of marriage’. After November 2009, the day the 
relevant provision was declared as unconstitutional, all persons who had 
been convicted by the criminal clause until that time had made appeals to 
have a retrial, and criminal indemnity was to be given to each one of them, 
too. To avoid such congestion and burden on the judiciary, the proviso was 
legislated to limit the scope of the retroactive effect. In virtue of the proviso 
the Constitutional Court no longer has to worry much about the burden of 
unlimited retrials and indemnities whenever some criminal law clause is 
struck down. In other words, thanks to the proviso the Constitutional Court 
has been able to focus on the constitutionality issue without any consider-
[Human Rights and Justice] 19 (2015).
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ation of the potential social burden which might be caused by its decision.
IV. Conclusion
(1) In Korea, the legislature and executive are often criticized for their 
lack of contribution to decriminalization. They are in fact responsible for an 
increase in the criminal law. Therefore, ‘decriminalizing’ decisions by the 
Constitutional Court are of particular importance. The decisions include 
that of 2009, holding that punishing sex under false promises of marriage 
was unconstitutional, as well as this “2015Decision,” also holding that 
punishing adultery was unconstitutional. Thanks to these preceding 
decisions, problems with strong decriminalization claims of several types of 
crimes have been resolved to a certain extent. However, one must admit 
that there remain many obstacles to overcome.
In Korea, punishment for homosexual acts in the military and 
punishment for the act of prostitution are still under debate. Moreover, in 
terms of administrative law, numerous cases involve disproportionate 
levels of punishment. In order to estimate the possibility of resolving such 
issues, it is important to recognize the current subject and criteria that 
would make it practically feasible. In the process of examining such 
subjects and criteria, the preceding cases, especially the adultery case of 
2015, involved the KCC as an organization that makes constitutional 
decisions based on general constitutional rights and values, and enjoys the 
relative trust of the people. Its contributions towards decriminalization are 
thus to be encouraged. 
Understanding these cases by putting emphasis on the criteria and 
subjects more deeply and in more detail is highly important. Because this 
understanding is essential since it could be used for predicting and 
realizing the future of the decriminalization movement in South Korea or 
other countries, which have similar social issues. In this article, I tried to 
explain and emphasize such criteria and subjects, especially related to the 
“2015Decision”.
(2) The decision on unconstitutionality reflects the trend in other parts 
of the world, where many countries are banning the criminal regulation of 
adultery and thus casting some doubt over whether criminal regulation is 
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helpful for maintaining household integrity and marriage purity. The 
decision also reflects the criticism that the criminal law intervenes in the 
privacy of the individual and represents an abuse of the state’s punishment 
power. It also reflects a weakening of the justification in the recent era for 
protecting women as a socially vulnerable class. There are now various 
opinions regarding the appropriateness of abolishing the criminal 
regulation of adultery, but the most important fact is that it has now been 
abolished in Korea by this landmark decision of the KCC.

